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A future in which humanity does not go extinct from something
like a meteor strike or nuclear war might contain vast quantities of
great happiness and human flourishing. But it might also contain
vast quantities of great misery and wasted potential. Any effort to
ensure a long happy future will have to strive both to ensure a long
future, by reducing extinction risks, and to ensure it is a happy one,
by improving the quality of life. Such an effort might succeed at the
former goal without succeeding at the latter. So any effort to ensure a
long happy future will increase the chance of such a future, but it will
also increase the chance of a long miserable future, even if it increases
the latter by a smaller amount. Granted this, if you are risk-averse, or
if morality requires you to choose using risk-averse preferences, then
you do better to work to bring about humanity’s extinction than to
secure its long-term survival. This conclusion seems monstrous. In
this paper, I try to understand why the argument in its favour goes
wrong.
1 Introduction
Let me begin on the final few pages of Reasons and Persons, where Parfit
asks us to consider three possibilities (Parfit, 1984, 453-4):
(1) Peace;
(2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the human population;
(3) A nuclear war that kills 100% of the human population.
He claims that (1) is better than (2), and (2) is better than (3). Most people,
he thinks, would agree to this. Then he asks by how much (1) is better than
(2), and by how much (2) is better than (3). He thinks the difference be-
tween (2) and (3) is vastly greater than the difference between (1) and (2).
His reason? Barring a major extinction event such as a nuclear winter, a
dramatically virulent disease, or a massive meteor strike, Earth will remain
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inhabitable for humans for a further billion years.1 We might suppose that,
in scenario (1), we will go on to inhabit the planet for that whole period, and
at a stable population of 10 billion humans at any given time. In that case,
scenario (1) will contain 10 billion billion years of human life. In scenario
(2), while the population will drop from 8 billion to 80 million initially, we
might suppose that, after at most a thousand years, it will bounce back and
humanity will continue for the remainder of the billion years at the sta-
ble population of 10 billion. So the difference between (1) and (2) is a little
under 8,000 billion years of human life—the life years lost during the mille-
nium of recovery following the war. This is an enormous difference by any
reckoning. But now consider the difference between (2) and (3). Scenario
(3) contains no further years of human life. And so the difference between
(2) and (3) is the 10 billion billion years of human life that (1) contains less
the 8,000 billion life years lost to the war, which is more than 9 billion bil-
lion years of human life. So, as Parfit says, the difference between (2) and
(3)—more than 9 billion billion years of human life—is vastly greater than
between (1) and (2)—just under 8,000 billion life years. Indeed, about a
million times greater.
Parfit himself doesn’t do much to draw out the consequences of this in-
sight. But, in recent years, some philosophers within the Effective Altruism
movement, known as longtermists, have noted that it has obvious implica-
tions for certain sorts of consequentialist (Bostrom, 2013; Beckstead, 2013;
Ord, 2020; Greaves & MacAskill, 2021). Simplifying greatly, suppose I must
choose to which of two charities I will donate a certain sum of money. If I
donate it to the Against Malaria Foundation (AMF), which distributes in-
secticidal nets in malarial regions of the world, there is a 90% chance that
it will save the lives of ten children under five years old who would other-
wise have died from malaria and who will now go on to live for a further
70 years; and there is a 10% chance that it will have no effect. So, were I to
donate to the AMF, it would, in expectation, increase the number of human
life years by 630.2 On the other hand, if I donate to the Longtermism Fund
(LF), which works to reduce the chance of a catastrophic event that results
in human extinction, I will lower by one in a millon billion the chance of
Parfit’s third scenario (3)—and thereby raise by one in a million billion the
chance of his first two scenarios, (1) or (2). So a donation to the LF will
result in around 9,000 expected life years.3 Then, the argument goes, we
1Here, I use the estimate from Hilary Greaves and William MacAskill’s work, though
the point is easily made with very different estimates (Greaves & MacAskill, 2021). Since
one upshot of this paper is that there are problems with their arguments and the arguments
of other longtermists, I try to use reasonably similar assumptions where I can.
210 children, each with 70 extra years of life, gives 700 life years. And then 90% of that
is 630 life years.
3At least 9 billion billion (9 × 1018) life years in scenario (1) or (2), and an increased
chance of one in 1 million billion (10−15), which gives at least 9,000 expected life years.
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should donate in the way that will maximise the expected number of life
years, and that means we should donate to LF when the alternative is AMF.
In this paper, I wish to raise a worry about this argument. I’ll begin
by improving it to ensure that we are considering the best version. Like
the version just given, the improved argument relies on a particular con-
sequentialist account of how to determine which is the morally correct or
morally best option to choose when faced with a decision between a range
of available options, such as the decision between donating to AMF or to LF
or not donating at all. This account relies on applying rational choice the-
ory in ethics. Rational choice theory is typically used to determine which
are the rationally permissible options to choose when faced with a deci-
sion. Typically, in order to make that determination, it asks for some in-
gredients: it asks you to enumerate a set of possible states of the world,
each of which specifies, up to a certain level of grain, how things have gone
in the past, how they are now, and how they will go in the future; it asks
you to assign to each option you might choose and each of these states
of the world a subjective utility that measures how much you personally
would value the outcome of choosing that option should the world be in
that state; and it asks you to assign to each possible option and each state of
the world a probability that measures how likely you personally think it is
that the state of the world will come about should you choose that option.
A theory of rational choice then offers a recipe by which to combine these
various components to give an ordering of the options in terms of their
subjective choiceworthiness, and many of them then say that rationality re-
quires you to choose from among the options at the top of the ordering.4
So, for instance, expected utility theory orders options by their expected
utility, where the expected utility of an option is the sum of the utilities of
its possible consequences, each weighted by the probability that the conse-
quence will come about given you choose that option. And it requires you
to choose an option from the top of the ordering.
When consequentialist arguments of the sort considered here apply ra-
tional choice theory in ethics, they switch out some of these ingredients.
They typically retain the states of the world you specified, as well as your
subjective probabilities, providing the latter satisfy all constraints of epis-
temic rationality, such as obeying the axioms of the probability calculus,
being proportioned to your evidence, and so on. But they replace your sub-
jective utilities—which, recall, measure how much you personally value
a state of the world—with something like morally ideal utilities—which
measure either how valuable a state of the world is from a completely im-
personal point of view, or how much you would value that state of the
4Others, which don’t assume that the ordering is total, might say you should choose
among those options for which there is no greater option in the ordering; and others still,
which are less demanding, say you should choose among those options that lie above a
certain point on the ordering.
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world were you to give at least the morally required level of consideration
to the lives of all others, which may not be the same level as your nearest
and dearest, but which is nonetheless higher than most people give. Hav-
ing tweaked the ingredients in this way, the consequentialist then appeals
to the same recipe by which to combine them to give an ordering of the op-
tions in terms of their moral choiceworthiness, and they say that morality
requires you to choose an option at the top. In other words, moral deci-
sion making is just rational decision making with the utilities that measure
the impersonal good, or at least a more impersonal good than most people
actually value.
For instance, take the consequentialist argument for donating to LF in-
stead of AMF. The impersonal or morally required conception of the good
is simply calculated by counting up the number of human life years lived;
and the theory of rational choice to which the argument appeals is expected
utility theory. The improved version of the argument I will give below ap-
peals to a more plausible account of the impersonal good, but it retains
the appeal to expected utility theory. The problem with this argument that
I wish to explore is that expected utility theory is not the correct theory
of rational choice. According to the correct theory, the ingredients of ra-
tional choice are not only states of the world, probabilities, and utilities;
rather, they are joined by a specification of the decision-maker’s attitudes
to risk. And then the probabilities, utilities, and attitudes to risk are com-
bined in a particular way to give the ordering of choiceworthiness from
which we are rationally required to choose an option at the top. Now, for
certain decision-makers—namely, those who are risk-neutral in a particu-
lar sense—this recipe returns the same ordering that expected utility theory
does. But for other decision-makers—namely, those who are risk-averse or
risk-inclined—it does not. So, at the most, the argument for donating to LF
applies only to risk-neutral individuals, and experimental evidence sug-
gests that such individuals are rather rare. But, in fact, I’ll go further. I’ll
argue that, when we assess the moral correctness of a decision, we should
not use the decision maker’s subjective attitudes to risk, but instead an ag-
gregate of the attitudes to risk endorsed by the individuals affected by the
decision-maker’s choice; and, moreover, this aggregate should place more
weight on the risk-averse individuals. Thus, when we assess the moral
correctness of a decision, we will typically be required to use a theory of
rational choice that governs risk-averse decision-makers. When we replace
expected utility theory with such a theory of rational choice in the argu-
ment for donating to LF, that argument no longer goes through. Indeed,
not only does the argument for working to avoid our extinction no longer
work; it is instead transformed into an argument for working to hasten that
extinction. And that, it seems to me, signals a problem with the argument.5
5In her 2019 Parfit Memorial Lecture at the Global Priorities Institute
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2 The improved argument for working to avoid ex-
tinction
The first thing to change in the argument based on Parfit’s observation is
the measure of impersonal goodness. In that argument, the moral utility
function measured the goodness of a state of the world by the number of
human life years it contains. But what makes a history good or bad is not
only how much or how little human life it contains, but also what that life
is like for the people who live it. Lives can go better or worse, be filled more
with pleasure than with pain or vice versa; be fulfilling or be thwarted; can
allow the subject to perfect their capacities to different degrees or not at
all; and so on. For the sake of simplicity, in our new argument, I will as-
sume a straightforward total hedonist utilitarian account of the impersonal
good—the goodness of a state of the world is just its total hedonic value,
which weighs the amount, intensity, and nature of the pleasure it contains
against the amount, intensity, and nature of the pain it contains. That’s not
because I think this is the correct account; and it’s not because I think all
proponents of longtermist arguments subscribe to it (though many do). It’s
simply for concreteness at this stage. My plan is to present a simple, con-
crete version of the argument first, so that we can see most clearly what
happens when we replace the assumption of expected utility theory with
a risk-sensitive decision theory. Then, in Section 5.2, when I consider how
the longtermist might respond, I’ll ask what happens to this argument if we
change the conception of the good it uses to include non-human lives and
other goods beside lives, to include non-hedonic features of those lives, to
include global features of the society and its accomplishments as a whole,
rather than merely aggregating those of individuals, and so on.
Of course, once we expand the conception of the impersonal good in
this way, we see that there are not merely two possible futures for the
world—one in which humanity goes extinct in the near future and one in
which it survives for a billion years—but many—one in which humanity
soon goes extinct, one in which it survives for a billion years and lives are
extremely pleasurable on average, one in which it survives and lives are
moderately pleasurable on average, one in which it survives and lives are
filled with pain and misery on average, and so on.
(https://youtu.be/eQWY96f41mU), Lara Buchak, to whose theory of rational choice
I will appeal in this paper, also appeals to that theory to question some related but different
conclusions of effective altruist arguments about the long-term future. She uses her theory
to argue that, faced with the decision whether to use a given finite pot of money to decrease
the chance of extinction or to improve the health of people in the present, we are morally
required to try to avert extinction; but faced with the decision whether to use a given finite
pot of money to improve the health of people in the present or to improve the chances of
a wonderful long-term future, we are morally required to improve the health of people in
the present.
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Indeed, there are also lots of possible durations for humanity’s exis-
tence beyond extinction within a century and survival for a billion years.
So the future may contain 10 billion billion extremely pleasurable human
life years, 10 billion billion moderately pleasurable ones, 10 million billion
moderately pleasurable ones, a thousand billion extremely painful ones, a
hundred million lives just worth living, and so on.
Again in the interests of simplicity and concreteness, we will consider
just four possible futures. Here they are:
(A) The long happy future. This is the best-case scenario. Humanity sur-
vives for the full billion possible years with a stable population around
10 billion at any given time. During that time, medical, technological,
ethical, and societal advances ensure that the vast majority of people
live lives of extraordinary pleasure and fulfilment.
(B) The long mediocre/medium-length happy future. This is a sort of catch-
all good-but-not-great option. It collects together many possible fu-
ture states that share roughly the same impersonal goodness. In one,
humanity survives the full billion years, some lives are happy, some
mediocre, some only just worth living, many are miserable. In an-
other, lives are as happy as in (A) on the whole, but humanity fails to
avoid all extinction risks, and they go extinct after a thousand years.
(C) The short mediocre future. Humanity goes extinct in the next century
with levels of happiness at a mediocre level.
(D) The long miserable future. This is the worst-case scenario. Humanity
survives for the full billion years with a stable population around 10
billion at any given time. During that time, the vast majority of people
live lives of unremitting pain and suffering, perhaps because they are
enslaved to serve the interests of a small oligarchy.
And here are the three possible options between which you must choose.
First, the status quo (SQ), in which you do nothing. Second, you donate to
the Quiet End Foundation (QEF), which works to bring about a peaceful,
painless end to humanity. Third, you donate to the Happy Future Fund
(HFF), which works to ensure a long happy future for the species.
For the moment, I won’t try to assign specific utilities to these states
of the world nor specific probabilities to their occurrence conditional on
choosing an particular option. Instead, I’ll assign the following placehold-
ers. That will then let us give a general account of when one option is better
than another. When we come to the revised version of the argument later
on, we’ll have to start feeding in specific numbers—but not yet.
First, the utilities of each possible state of the world:
A B C D
U(−) w v u −t
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where −t < 0 < u < v < w.6
Second, the probabilities of each state of the world given each of the
three options, SQ, QEF, and HFF:
A B C D
P(−|SQ) p q r s
P(−|QEF) p− 2ε q− 2ε r + 6ε s− 2ε
P(−|HFF) p + 3ε q + 2ε r− 6ε s + ε
The argument for these assignments runs as follows—inevitably, it is rather
speculative. First, suppose you donate to the Quiet End Foundation (QEF),
which works to bring about a peaceful, painless end to humanity. Your
money isn’t going to do much, but it will shift the probabilities a little.
Let’s say you’ll raise the probability of imminent extinction (C) by some
amount, say 6ε, where ε is some very very small positive probability, and
thereby lower the probability of a future for humanity by the same amount;
suppose you’ll lower the probability of each of the states (A, B, and D) in
which humanity has a future by the same amount, that is, 2ε.
Second, suppose you donate to the Happy Future Fund (HFF), which
works to ensure a long happy future for the species. Again, your money
isn’t going to do much, but again it will shift the probabilities a little. You’ll
raise the probability of the long happy future (A) by some small amount,
say 3ε, and you’ll raise the probability of (B) by 2ε. But, and here we come
to a crucial point, what HFF does to increase the probability of scenario
(A) thereby increases of (D) as well, even if not by as much, since there
is always the possibility that their attempts to ensure a long happy future
only manage to ensure a long future, and that then opens the possibility
of a long miserable future. And indeed many of the ways we might try to
ensure a long happy future might make a long miserable one more likely
than it would otherwise be. We see something like this with so-called gain-
of-function research on viruses (Sharples et al., 2015). In that sort of work,
virologists engineer versions of a virus, such as a coronavirus or an in-
fluenza virus, that are more dangerous than those that have occurred natu-
rally so far, either by increasing transmissibility or increasing infection fa-
tality rates. They do this in order to understand ways in which the viruses
might mutate naturally in the future so that they can develop therapeu-
tics to treat the illnesses caused by these mutations and vaccines to prevent
their spread. But doing so of course opens the possibility that these en-
hanced microbes escape the laboratory where they’re created, and therefore
6Both expected utility theory and the risk-weighted expected utility theory we’ll come
to use in the revised version of the argument are insensitive to positive linear transforma-
tions of utilities. That is, they order options in exactly the same way whether we measure
their value at a state of the world using the utility function U(−) or using a positive linear
transformation of it, αU(−) + β, where α > 0. So it is not in fact speaking necessary to
specify that the moral utility of D is negative. But it does no harm.
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the possibility that a bad actor will exploit them to devastating effect—after
all, with only the threat of ever deploying an extremely virulent and deadly
virus, someone might hold entire societies to ransom. And the same sort
of risk emerges from research into AI safety and nuclear safety. By imag-
ining the most devastating uses to which these technologies might be put
in order to guard against them, we might create blueprints for bad actors
and thereby make these uses more likely. So, donating to HFF raises the
probability of the long miserable future, let’s say by ε. And it decreases the
probability of imminent extinction (C) by 6ε.
With these in hand, we can now calculate the expected utility of each
option, and see that we should prefer the Happy Future Fund to the status
quo, and the status quo to the Quiet End Foundation provided 3u + t <
w+ v and 6u+ t < 3w+ 2v. And that’s a reasonable assumption: after all, if
the difference between the long miserable future and extinction is no more
than the difference between the long happy future and extinction, then t <
w and t < 3w;7 and if the catch-all good-but-not-great outcome is quite a
lot better than the extinction outcome, then 3u < v and 6u < 2v. To avoid
cluttering the text with the calculation, I spell it out in Appendix A. So,
according to the version of consequentialism that pairs this total hedonist
utilitarian axiology with expected utility theory, you should donate to the
Happy Future Fund.
3 Rational choice theory and risk
The argument for donating to the Happy Future Fund assumes that ex-
pected utility theory is the correct theory of rational choice. But unfortu-
nately it isn’t. To get a sense of why it goes wrong, consider the following
example.8 Sheila is a keen birdwatcher. Every time she sees a new species,
it gives her great pleasure. What’s more, the amount of extra pleasure each
new species brings is the same no matter many she’s seen before. Her first
species—a blue tit in her grandparents’ garden as a child—adds as much
happiness to her stock as her two hundredth—a golden eagle high above
Glenshee when she’s thirty. And Sheila is a hedonist who cares only for
pleasure. Now suppose she is planning a birding trip for her birthday, and
7It wouldn’t be so hard to challenge this assumption, since some think that the range
of pain and misery we can experience is greater than the range of pleasure and fulfilment.
If that’s right, even expected utility theory might recommend donating to the Quiet End
Foundation.
8For further motivations, see (Buchak, 2013, Chapters 1 and 2). The shortcomings of
expected utility theory were first identified by Allais (1953). He presented four different
options, and asked us to agree that we would prefer the first to the second and the fourth
to the third. He then showed that there is no way to assign utilities to the outcomes of the
options so that these preferences line up with the ordering of the options by their expected
utility. For a good introduction, see (Steele & Stefánsson, 2020, Section 5.1).
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she must choose between two nature reserves: in one, N1, she’s sure to see
49 new species; in the other, N2, she’ll see 100 if the migration hasn’t started
and none if it has. And she’s 50% confident that it has started. Here’s the
payoff table for her choice, where M says that the migration has started and




According to expected utility theory, Sheila should choose to go to N2,
since, if each new species adds a single utile to an outcome, N2 has ex-
pected utility of 50 utiles, while N1 has 49. And yet it seems quite rational
for her to choose N1. In that way, she is assured of seeing some new species;
indeed, she’s assured of seeing quite a lot of new species; she does not risk
seeing none, which she does risk if she goes to N2. If Sheila chooses to go
to N1, we might say that she is risk-averse, though perhaps only slightly.
N2 is a risky option: it gives the possibility of the best outcome, namely,
the one in which she sees 100 new species, but it also opens the possibility
of the worst outcome, namely, the one in which she sees none. In contrast,
N1 is a risk-free option: it gives you no possibility of the best outcome,
but equally no possibility of the worst one either; it guarantees Sheila a
middle-ranked option; its worst case outcome, which is just its guaranteed
outcome of 49 species is better than the worst case outcome of N2, which is
seeing no species; but its best case outcome, which is again its guaranteed
outcome of seeing 49 species, is worse than the best case outcome of N2.
Standard expected utility theory says that the weight that each outcome re-
ceives before they are summed to give the expected utility of an option is
just the probability of that outcome given that you choose the option. But
this ignores the risk-sensitive agent’s desire to take into account not only
the probability of the outcome but where it ranks in the ordering of out-
comes from best to worst. The risk-averse agent will wish to give greater
weight to worse case outcomes than expected utility theory requires and
less weight to the better case outcomes, while the risk-seeking agent will
wish to give less weight to the worse cases and more to the better cases.
How might we capture this in our theory of rational choice? The most
sophisticated and best developed way to amend expected utility theory to
accommodate these considerations is due to Lara Buchak (2013) and it is
called risk-weighted expected utility theory. Whereas expected utility theory
tells you to pick an option that maximises the expected utility from the
point of view of your subjective probabilities and utilities, risk-weighted
expected utility theory tells you to pick an option that maximises the risk-
weighted expected utility from the point of view of your subjective prob-
abilities, utilities, and attitudes to risk. Let’s see how we represent these
attitudes to risk and how we define risk-weighted utility in terms of them.
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Your expected utility for an option is the sum of the utilities you assign
to its outcome at different possible states of the world, each weighted by
the probability you assign to that possible state on the supposition that you
choose the option. Your risk-weighted expected utility of an option is also
a weighted sum of your utilities for it given the different possible states
of the world, but the weight assigned to its utility at a particular state of
the world is determined not by your probability for that state of the world
given you choose it, but by the probability you’ll receive at least that much
utility by choosing that option, the probability you’ll receive more than that
utility by choosing that option, and also the individual’s attitudes to risk.
Here’s how it works in Buchak’s theory. We model your attitudes to risk
as a function R that takes numbers between 0 and 1 and returns a number
between 0 and 1. We assume that R has three properties:
(i) R(0) = 0 and R(1) = 1,
(ii) r is strictly increasing, so that if p < q then R(p) < R(q), and
(iii) R is continuous.
Now, to illustrate how risk-weighted expected utility theory works, sup-
pose there are just three states of the world, S1, S2, and S3. Suppose O is an
option with the following utilities at those states:
S1 S2 S3
U(− & O) u1 u2 u3
And, on the supposition that O is chosen, the probabilities of the states are
these:
S1 S2 S3
P(−|O) p1 p2 p3
And, suppose S1 is the worst case outcome for O, then S2, and S3 is the best
case. That is, u1 < u2 < u3. Then the expected utility of O is
EU(O) = p1u1 + p2u2 + p3u3
So the weight assigned to the utility ui is the probability pi. Now notice
that, given O, the probability pi of a state Si is equal to the probability that
O will obtain for you at least utility ui less the probability that it will obtain
for you more than that utility. So
EU(O) = [(p1 + p2 + p3)− (p2 + p3)]u1 + [(p2 + p3)− p3]u2 + p3u3
Now, when we calculate the risk-weighted expected utility of O, the weight
for utility ui is the risk-transformed probability that O will obtain for you at
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least utility ui less the risk-transformed probability that it will obtain for you
more than that utility. So
REU(O) =
[R(p1 + p2 + p3)− R(p2 + p3)]u1+
[R(p2 + p3)− R(p3)]u2+
R(p3)u3
Roughly speaking, if R is convex, then the individual is risk-averse, for
then the weights assigned to the worse case outcomes are greater than those
that expected utility theory assigns, while the weights assigned to the best
case outcomes are less. If R is concave, the individual is risk-inclined. And
if R is linear, so that R(x) = x, then the risk-weighted expected utility of an
option is just its expected utility, so the individual is risk-neutral.
To see an example at work, consider Sheila’s decision whether to go
to reserve N1 or N2. First, the risk-weighted expected utility of the safe
option, N1.
REU(N1) = (R(P(M ∨M|N1)− R(P(M|N1)))U(M & N1)+
R(P(M|N1))U(M & N1) =
(1− R(1/2))49 + R(1/2)49 = 49
since P(M ∨M) = 1, so R(P(M ∨M|N1)) = 1. Second, the risk-weighted
expected utility of the risky option, N2.
REU(N2) = (R(P(M ∨M|N2)− R(P(M|N2)))U(M & N2)+
R(P(M|N2))U(M & N2) =
(1− R(1/2))0 + R(1/2)100 = R(1/2)100
So REU(N2) < REU(N1) iff R(0.5) < 0.49. That is, if Sheila is only a little
risk-averse, rational choice theory will require her to choose the safe option,
N1.
Now let us apply this to the choice between doing nothing, donating to
the Happy Future Fund, and donating to the Quiet End Foundation. In con-
trast with the expected utility calculation, keeping things general doesn’t
help a great deal—the devil, in this case, is in the details. So we need to
specify some numbers.
First, the utilities that morality requires you to assign—according to the
arguments we’re discussing, these should measure the impersonal good
that a state of the world contains; and, more specifically, we’re assuming
a total hedonist utilitarian axiology. So first, we must specify a unit. Let’s
say that each human life year lived with the sort of extraordinary pleasure
envisaged in scenario A adds one unit of utility, or utile, to the goodness
of the states of the future. So the moral utility of A is 1019 utiles, since it
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contains 1019 human life years at this very high level of utility. And let’s
say that the moral utility of B is 1013 utiles, since it contains 1013 life years
at that level, or many more life years but at a far poorer level on average,
which amounts to the same utility. The moral utility of C is 106 utiles, since
it contains 100 years lived at the same average level that, in scenario B,
when lived for a billion years gave 1013 utiles. And finally scenario D.
Here, we assume that some lives contain such pain and suffering that they
are genuinely not worth living; that is, they contribute negatively to the
utility of the world. Indeed, I’ll assume that it is possible to experience
pain as bad as the greatest pleasure is good. That is, the moral utility of
the worst case scenario is simply the negative of the moral utility of the
best case scenario, where we are taking our zero point to be the utility of
non-existence. So the moral utility of D is −1019.
Second, let’s try to assign probabilities to these outcomes in the absence
of any intervention on your part; then we’ll say how donating to different
charities affects these probabilities. Inevitably these assignments will be
very speculative. It seems clear that the long mediocre or short happy fu-
ture is by far the most likely, absent any intervention, since it can be realised
in so many different ways. I’ll use a conservative estimate for the probabil-
ity of extinction in the next century. And I’ll say that the long happy future,
while very unlikely, is nonetheless much much more likely than the long
miserable one. More precisely, I’ll say the probability of extinction C is one
in a thousand ( 1103 ), the long future A is a thousand times less likely than
that ( 1106 ), the long miserable future D is a thousand times less likely than
that ( 1109 ), and the long mediocre or short happy future mops up the rest of





Finally, as before, let’s consider three interventions you might make: do
nothing (SQ), donate to the Quiet End Foundation (QEF), or donate to the
Happy Future Fund (HFF). As before, your money isn’t going to do much,
but it will shift the probabilities a little. Let’s assume that the interventions
change the probabilities in the way we described above, but with ε = 11010 .
So, if you donate to QEF, you’ll raise the probability of imminent extinction
(C) by 61010 , and so on.
Once again, I leave the calculations to Appendix A and here only report
the conclusion. Suppose your risk function is R(x) = xn for n > 32 . So you
are risk averse. Indeed, you have the level of risk aversion that would lead
you, in Sheila’s situation, to prefer a guarantee of seeing 35 new species of
bird to a 50% chance of seeing 100 new species and a 50% chance of seeing
none. Then REU(HFF) < REU(SQ) < REU(QEF). So, you should not
donate to the Happy Future Fund, and you should not do nothing—you
should donate to the Quiet End Foundation. So, if we replace expected
utility theory with risk-weighted expected utility, then the effective altruist
must give different advice to individuals with different attitudes to risk.
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And indeed the advice they give to mildly risk-averse individuals will be
to donate to charities that work towards a peaceful end to humanity.
For many, this in itself is a reductio of the approach we’ve been explor-
ing. For them, it can never be the morally right thing to try to end human-
ity. What, then, has gone wrong? Before we consider that, let’s see how our
appeal to risk-weighted expected utility might yield an even stronger and
more concerning result.
4 What we together risk
The conclusion of the previous section is a little alarming. According to the
methodology favoured by the longtermists, where moral choice is just ra-
tional choice with the impersonal utilities demanded by morality, the more
risk-averse members of our society should focus their philanthropic actions
on hastening the extinction of humanity. But I think things are worse than
that. I think this is not only what the longtermist should say to the risk-
averse in our society, but what they should say to everyone, whether risk-
averse, risk-inclined, or risk-neutral. In this section, I’ll try to explain why.
To motivate the central principle used in the argument, consider the fol-
lowing case. A group of hikers make an attempt on the summit of a high,
snow-covered mountain.9 The route they have chosen is treacherous and
they rope up, tying themselves to one another in a line so that, should one
of them slip, the other will be able to prevent a dangerous fall. At one point
in their ascent, the leader faces a choice. She is at the beginning of a partic-
ularly treacherous section—to climb up it is dangerous, but to climb down
once you’ve started is nearly impossible. She also realises that she’s at the
point at which the rope will not provide much security, and will indeed
endanger the others roped to her: if she falls while attempting this section,
the whole group will fall with her, very badly injuring themselves. Due
to changing weather, she must make the choice before she has a chance to
consult with the group. Should she continue onwards and give the group
the opportunity to reach the summit but also leave them vulnerable to seri-
ous injury, or should she begin the descent and lead the whole group down
to the bottom safely?
She has climbed with this group for many years. She knows that each of
them values getting to the summit just as much as she does; each disvalues
severe injury just as much as she does; and each assigns the same mid-
dling value to descending now, not attaining the summit, but remaining
uninjured. You might think, then, that each member of the group would
favour the same option at this point—they’d all favour ascending or they’d
all favour descending. But of course it’s a consequence of Buchak’s theory
that they might all agree on the utilities and the credences, but disagree
9Thanks to Philip Ebert for helping me formulate this example!
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on what to do because they have different attitudes to risk. In fact, three
out of the group of eight are risk-averse in a way that makes them wish to
descend, while the remaining five wish to continue and accept the risk of
injury in order to secure the possibility of attaining the summit. The leaders
knows this. What should she do?
It seems to me that she should descend. This suggests that, when we
make a decision that affects other people with different attitudes to risk,
and when one of the possible outcomes of that decision involves serious
harm to those people, we should give greater weight to the preferences
of the risk-averse among them than to the risk-neutral or risk-inclined. If
that’s so, then it might be that the effective altruist should not only advise
the risk-averse to donate to the Quiet End Foundation, but should advise
everyone in this way, since the morally right choice is the one made with
the epistemically ideal credences, the morally ideal utilities, and the risk-
attitudes obtained by aggregating the risk attitude of all the people who
will be affected by the decision in some way that gives most weight to the
attitudes of the risk-averse.
To the best of my knowledge, Lara Buchak is the first to try to formulate
a general principle that covers such situations. Here it is:10
Risk Principle When making a decision for an individual, choose
under the assumption that he has the most risk-avoidant atti-
tude within reason unless we know that he has a different risk
attitude, in which case, choose using his risk attitude. (Buchak,
2017, 632)
Here, as when she applies the principle to a different question about long-
term global priorities in her 2019 Parfit Memorial Lecture, Buchak draws
a distinction between rational attitudes to risk and reasonable ones. All
reasonable attitudes will be rational, but not vice versa. So very extreme
risk-aversion or extreme risk-inclination will count as rational, but perhaps
not reasonable, just as being indifferent to pain if it occurs on a Tuesday, but
not if it occurs at another time might be thought rational but not reasonable
(Parfit, 1984, 124). Buchak then suggests that, when we do not know the
risk attitudes of a person for whom we make a decision, we should make
that decision using the most risk-averse attitudes that are reasonable, even
if there are more risk-averse attitudes that are rational.
As the example of the climbers above illustrates, I think Buchak’s prin-
ciple has a kernel of truth. But I think we must amend it in various ways;
and we must extend it to cover those cases in which (i) we choose not just
for one individual but for many, and (ii) where our choice will affect differ-
ent populations depending on how things turn out.
10Cf. also (Rozen & Fiat, ms).
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First, Buchak’s principle divides the cases into only two sorts: those in
which you know the person’s risk attitudes and those in which you don’t.
It says: if you know them, use them; if you don’t, use the most risk-averse
among the reasonable attitudes. But of course you might know something
about the other person’s risk attitudes without knowing everything. For
instance, you might know that they are risk-inclined, but you don’t know
to what extent; so you know that their risk function is concave, but you
don’t know which specific concave function it is. In this case, it seems
wrong to use the most risk-averse reasonable risk attitudes to make your
choice on their behalf. You know for sure the person on whose behalf you
make the decision isn’t so risk-averse as this, and indeed isn’t risk-averse
at all! So we might amend the principle so that we use the most risk-averse
reasonable attitudes among those that our evidence doesn’t rule out them
having.
But even this seems too strong. You might have extremely strong but
not conclusive evidence that the person affected by your action is risk-
inclined; perhaps your evidence doesn’t rule out that they have the most
risk-averse reasonable risk attitudes, but it does make that very very un-
likely. So you don’t know that they are risk-inclined, but you’ve got very
good reason for thinking they are; and you don’t know that they do not
have the most risk-averse reasonable risk attitudes, but you’ve got very
good reason for thinking they don’t. In this case, Buchak thinks you should
nonetheless use the most risk-averse reasonable risk attitudes when you
choose on their behalf. But this seems far too strong to me. It seems that
you should certainly give greater weight to the more risk-averse attitudes
among those you think they might have than the evidence seems to sug-
gest; but you should not completely ignore your evidence. Having very
strong evidence that they are risk-inclined, you should choose on their be-
half using risk attitudes that are less risk-averse than those you’d use if
your evidence strongly suggested that they are risk-averse, for instance,
and less risk-averse than those you’d use if your evidence that they are
risk-inclined was weaker. So evidence does make a difference, even when
it’s not conclusive.
Buchak objects to this approach as follows:
When we make a decision for another person, we consider what
no one could fault us for, so to speak [...] [F]inding out that
a majority of people would prefer chocolate [ice cream] could
give me reason to choose chocolate for my acquaintance, even
if I know a sizable minority would prefer vanilla; but in the risk
case, finding out a majority would take the risk could not give
me strong enough reason to choose the risk for my acquain-
tance, if I knew a sizable minority would not take the risk. Dif-
ferent reasonable utility assignments are on a par in a way that
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different reasonable risk assignments are not: we default to risk
avoidance, but there is nothing to single out any utility values
as default. (Buchak, 2017, 631-2)
In fact, I think Buchak is right about the case she describes, but only be-
cause she specifies that there’s a sizable minority that would not take the
risk. But, as stated, her principle entails something much stronger than
this. Even if there were only a one in a million chance that your acquain-
tance would reject the risk, the Risk Principle entails that you should not
choose the risk on their behalf. But that seems too strong. And, in this sit-
uation, even if they did end up being that one-in-a-million person who is
so risk-averse that they’d reject the risk, I don’t think they could find fault
with your decision. They would disagree with it, of course, and they’d pre-
fer you chose differently, but if they know that you chose on their behalf by
appealing to your very strong evidence that their risk-attitudes were not
the most risk-averse reasonable ones, I think it would be strange for them
to find fault with that decision. So I think Buchak is wrong to think that
we default to risk-aversion; instead, the asymmetry between risk-aversion
and risk-inclination is that more risk-averse possibilities and individuals
should be given greater weight than more risk-inclined ones.
As it is stated, Buchak’s principle applies only when you are making a
decision for an individual, rather than for a group. And there again, I think
the natural extension of the principle should be weakened. It seems that
we do not consider immoral any decision on behalf of a group that goes
against the preferences of the most risk-averse reasonable person possible,
or even against preferences of the most risk-averse reasonable person in
that group. For instance, it seems perfectly reasonable to be so risk-averse
that you think the dangers of nuclear power outweigh the benefits, and yet
it is morally permissible for a policymaker to pursue the project of building
nuclear power stations because, while they give extra weight to the more
risk-averse in the society affected, that isn’t sufficient to outweigh the pref-
erences of the vast majority who think the benefits outweigh the dangers.
Another crucial caveat to Buchak’s principle is that it seems to apply
only to decisions in which there is a risk of harm. Suppose that I must
choose, on behalf of myself and my travelling companion, where we will go
for a holiday. There are two options: Budapest and Bucharest. I know that
going to Budapest will be very good, while I don’t know whether Bucharest
will be good or absolutely wonderful, but I know those are the possibilities.
Then the risk-averse option is Budapest, and yet even if my travelling com-
panion is risk-averse while I am risk-inclined, it seems that I do nothing
morally wrong if I choose the risky option of Bucharest as our destination.
And the reason that this is permissible is that none of the possible outcomes
involves any harm.
Finally, in many decisions, there is a single population who will be af-
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fected by your actions regardless of how the world turns out, and in those
cases, it is of course the risk attitudes of the people in that population you
should aggregate to give the risk attitudes you’ll use to make the decision
on their behalf, weighting the more risk-averse more, as I’ve argued. But
in some cases, and for instance in the choice between the Quiet End Foun-
dation and the Happy Future Fund, different populations will be affected
depending on how the world turns out: the world will contain different
people in the four situations A, B, C, and D. How then are we to com-
bine uncertainty about the population affected with information about the
distribution of risk attitudes among those different possible populations?
I think this is going to be a difficult question in general, just as it’ll be dif-
ficult to formulate principles that govern situations in which there’s sub-
stantial uncertainty about the distribution of risk attitudes in the popula-
tion affected, but I think we can say one thing for certain: suppose it’s the
case that, for any of the possibly affected populations, were they the only
population affected, you’d not choose the risky option, then you shouldn’t
choose the risky option when there’s uncertainty about which population
will be affected.
Bringing all of this together, let’s try to reformulate Buchak’s risk prin-
ciple:
Risk Principle?
(i) Choosing on behalf of an individual when you’re uncertain about
their risk attitudes When you make a decision on behalf
of another person that might result in harm to that per-
son, you should use a risk attitude obtained by aggregat-
ing the risk attitudes that your evidence says that person
might have. And, when performing this aggregation, you
should pay attention to how likely your evidence makes it
that they have each possible risk attitude, but you should
also give greater weight to the more risk-averse attitudes
and less weight to the more risk-inclined ones than the ev-
idence suggests.
(ii) Choosing on behalf of a group when there’s diversity of risk at-
titudes among its members When you make a decision on
behalf of a group of people that might result in harm to
the people in that group, you should use a risk attitude ob-
tained by aggregating the risk attitudes that those people
have. And, when performing this aggregation, you should
give greater weight to more risk-averse individuals in the
group.
(iii) Choosing on behalf of a group when there’s uncertainty about the
risk attitudes of its members either because a single population
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is affected but you don’t know the distribution of risk attitudes
within it, or because you don’t know which population will be
affected When you make a decision on behalf of a group
of people that might result in harm to the people in that
group, and you are uncertain about the distribution of the
risk attitudes in that group, then you should work through
each of the possible populations with their distributions of
risk attitudes in turn, perform the sort of aggregation we
saw in (ii) above, then take each of those aggregates and
aggregate those, this time paying attention to how likely
your evidence makes each of the populations they aggre-
gate, but also giving more weight to the more risk-averse
aggregates and less weight to the more risk-inclined ones
than the evidence suggests.
Like Buchak’s, this version is not fully specified. In Buchak’s, that was
because the notion of reasonable risk attitudes remained unspecified. In
this version, it’s because we haven’t said how to aggregate risk attitudes
nor how to determine exactly what extra weight an attitude receives in
such an aggregation because it is risk-averse. I will leave the principle un-
derspecified in this way, but let me quickly illustrate the sort of aggrega-
tion procedure we might use. Suppose we have a group of n individuals
and their individual risk attitudes are represented by the Buchakian risk
functions R1, . . . , Rn. Then we might aggregate those individual risk func-
tions to give the aggregate risk function that represents the collective risk
attitudes of the group by taking a weighted average of them: that is, the
risk function RG of the group is RG = λ1R1 + . . . λnRn for some weights
λ1, . . . , λn, each of which is non-negative and which together sum to 1.
Then we might ensure that λi is greater the more risk averse (and thus
convex) Ri is.
In any case, underspecified though the Risk Principle? is in various
ways, I think it’s determinate enough to pose the problem I want to pose.
Many people are quite risk averse; indeed, the empirical evidence suggests
that most are (MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979; Rabin & Thaler, 2001; Oliver,
2003). We should expect that to continue into the future. So each of the
possible populations affected by my choice of where to donate my money—
that is, the populations that inhabit scenarios A, B, C, and D, respectively—
are likely to include a large proportion of risk-averse individuals. And so
the third clause of the Risk Principle?—that is, (iii)—might well say that
I should choose on their behalf using an aggregated risk function that is
pretty risk-averse, and perhaps sufficiently risk-averse that it demands we
donate to the Quiet End Foundation rather than the Happy Future Fund or
the Against Malaria Foundation or whatever other possibilities there are.
What I have offered, then, is not a definitive argument that the longter-
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mists must now focus their energies on bringing about the extinction of
humanity and encouraging others to donate their resources to helping. But
I hope to have made it pretty plausible that this is what they should do.
5 How should we respond to this argument?
How should we respond to these two arguments? The first is for the weaker
conclusion that, for many people who are risk averse, the morally correct
choice is to donate to the Quiet End Foundation. The second is for the
stronger conclusion that, for everyone regardless of attitudes to risk, the
morally correct choice is to donate in that way. Here’s the first in more
detail:
(P1) The morally correct choice for you is the one required by the correct
decision theory when that theory is applied using certain attitudes of
yours and certain attitudes set by morality.
(P2) The correct decision theory is risk-weighted expected utility theory.
(P3) When you apply risk-weighted expected utility theory in ethics, you
should use your own credences and risk attitudes, providing they’re
rational and reasonable, but you should use the moral utilities, which
measure the impersonal good.
(P4) Given your current evidential and historical situation, if you are mod-
erately risk-averse, you maximise your risk-weighted expected moral
utility by choosing to donate to the Quiet End Foundation rather than
by doing nothing or donating to the Happy Future Fund.
Therefore,
(C) If you are even mildly risk-averse, the morally correct choice for you
is to donate to the Quiet End Foundation.
And the second:
(P1′) The morally correct choice for you is the one required by the correct
decision theory when that theory is applied using certain attitudes of
yours and certain attitudes set by morality.
(P2′) The correct decision theory is risk-weighted expected utility theory.
(P3′) When you apply risk-weighted expected utility theory in ethics, you
should use your own credences, providing they’re reasonable and ra-
tional, but you should use the moral utilities, which measure the im-
personal good, and you should use risk attitudes obtained by aggre-
gating actual and possible risk attitudes in the populations affected
in line with the Risk Principle?.
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(P4′) Given your current evidential and historical situation, you maximise
the risk-weighted expected moral utility by choosing to donate to the
Quiet End Foundation rather than by doing nothing or donating to
the Happy Future Fund.
Therefore,
(C′) Whether you are risk-averse or not, the morally correct choice for you
is to donate to the Quiet End Foundation.
5.1 Biting the bullet
Of course, the simplest response is to accept the conclusions. I have nothing
to offer as a reply to that. Many people will judge it obviously mistaken,
but the effective altruists pride themselves on being unmoved by such intu-
itions about moral rightness, and this is often a great strength of the move-
ment. And indeed, longtermist thought already runs strongly counter to
our intuitive moral judgments, since it asks us to direct our efforts and re-
sources towards a tiny probability of a huge long-term payoff instead of a
very high probability of a smaller but still extremely significant short-term
payoff, such as saving lives by distributing insecticidal nets to those who
need them. What’s more, appealing to alternative moral theories to argue
for the immorality of bringing humanity to extinction is obviously not go-
ing to persuade a utilitarian that this consequence of their moral theory is
wrong. So let’s leave this and say how we might reject the conclusion.
5.2 Conceptions of the impersonal good
One natural place to look for the argument’s weakness is in its axiology.
Throughout, we have assumed the austere, monistic conception of imper-
sonal goodness offered by the hedonist utilitarian and restricted only to
human pleasure and pain.
So first, we might expand the pale of moral consideration to include
non-human animals and non-biological sentient beings, such as artificial
intelligences, robots, and minds inside computer simulations. But, this is
unlikely to change the problem significantly. It only means that there are
more minds to contain great pleasure in situation A, but also more to con-
tain great suffering in situation B. And of course there is the risk that hu-
manity continues to give non-human suffering less weight than we should,
and as a result non-human animals and artificial intelligences are doomed
to live miserable lives, just as factory-farmed animals currently do.
Second, we might change what contributes to the impersonal goodness
of a situation. For instance, we might say that there are features of a world
that contains flourishing humans that add goodness, while there are no
corresponding features of a world that contains miserable humans that add
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the same badness. One example might be the so-called higher goods of
aesthetic and intellectual achievements. In situation A, we might suppose,
people will produce art, poetry, philosophy, music, science, mathematics,
and so on. And we might think that the existence of such achievements
adds goodness over and above the pleasure that people experience when
they engage with them; they somehow have an intrinsic goodness as well
as an instrumental goodness. This would boost the goodness of A, but
it leaves the badness of D unchanged, since the absence of these goods
is neutral, and there is nothing that exists in world D that adds further
badness to D in the way these higher goods add goodness to A. If these
higher goods add enough goodness to A without changing the badness
of D, then it may well be that even the risk-averse will prefer the Happy
Future Fund over the Quiet End Foundation.
Of course, the most obvious move in this direction is simply to assume
that the existence of humanity adds impersonal goodness beyond the plea-
sure or pain experienced by the humans who exist. Or perhaps it’s not the
existence of humans specifically that adds the value, but the existence of
beings from some class to which humans belong, such as the class of in-
telligent beings or moral agents or beings capable of ascribing meaning to
the world and finding value in it. Again, the idea is that the existence of
these creatures is good independent of the work to which they put their
special status. So, as for the case of the higher goods, this would add good-
ness to A, which contains such creatures, but not only would it not add
corresponding badness to D; it would in fact add goodness to D, since
D contains these beings who boast the special status. And it might add
enough goodness to A and D that it would reverse the risk-averse person’s
preferences between the charities.
My own view is that it is better not to think of the existence of intelligent
beings or moral agents as adding impersonal goodness regardless of how
they deploy that intelligence or moral agency. Rather, when we ascribe
impersonal value to the existence of humans, we do so because of their po-
tential for doing things that are impersonally valuable, such as creating art
and science, loving and caring for one another, making each other happy
and fulfilled, and so on. But in scenario D, we know that they have not
fulfilled that potential, and so there is no value added to that scenario by
the fact that beings exist in it that might have done something much better.
And, at least if we suppose that the misery in scenario D is the result of hu-
man cruelty or lack of moral care, we might think the fact that the misery
is the result of human immorality makes it have lower moral utility.
For those who prefer an axiology on which it is not the hedonic fea-
tures of a situation that determine its impersonal goodness, but rather the
degree to which the preferences of the individuals who exist in that situa-
tion are satisfied, you might hope to appeal to the fact that people have a
strong preference for humanity to continue to exist, which gives a substan-
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tial boost to A and D, perhaps enough to make the Happy Future Fund the
better option. But I think this only seems plausible because we’ve grained
our preferences too coarsely. People do not have a preference for humanity
to continue to exist regardless of how humans behave and the quality of the lives
they live. They have a preference for humanity continuing in a way that is,
on balance, positive. So adding the good of preference satisfaction to the
hedonic good will likely boost the goodness of A, since A contains a lot of
pleasure and also satisfies the preferences of most people, but it will also
boost the badness of D, since D contains a lot of pain and also thwarts the
preferences of most people.
The same is true if we appeal to obligations that we have to those who
have lived before us (Baier, 1981). At this point, we step outside the con-
sequentialist framework in which effective altruist arguments are usually
presented, and into a deontological framework. But we might marry these
two approaches and say that obligations rule out certain options from the
outset and then consequentialist reasoning enters to pick between the re-
maining ones. Here, we might think that past generations created much
of what they did and fought for what they did and bequeathed to us the
fruits of their labours and their sacrifices on the understanding that hu-
manity would continue to exist. And you might think that, by benefitting
from what they bequeathed to us—those goods for which they laboured
and which they made sacrifices to obtain—we take on an obligation not
to go against their wishes and bring humanity to an end. But, as before, I
think what they really wished was that humanity continue to exist in a way
they considered positive. And so obligations to them don’t rule out ending
humanity if by doing so you avoid a universally miserable human exis-
tence.
5.3 The risk attitudes of possible future people
The stronger conclusion of our argument above is that, not only should
a risk-averse individual donate to the Quiet End Foundation instead of
the Happy Future Fund, but everyone should, even those who are very
strongly risk-inclined. The argument for that relied on two claims. First, a
normative claim, namely, clause (iii) of the Risk Principle?. Second, an em-
pirical claim, namely, that the populations in situations A, B, C, and D will
contain a substantial proportion of risk-averse individuals whose risk atti-
tudes should lead them to prefer the Quiet End Foundation to the Happy
Future Fund. We might support the empirical claim by extrapolating from
current populations, all of which seem to contain very substantial propor-
tions of risk-averse individuals. But perhaps there is reason to doubt this
projection into the future.
First, you might think that the prevalence of risk aversion in past and
current populations is a result of evolutionary pressures exerted by the
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scarcity of resources, the presence of rare high-stakes decisions, or the pres-
sures of living in small groups (Okasha, 2007; Zhang et al., 2014; Hintze
et al., 2015). And you might think that, in scenario A, each of these pres-
sures will no longer exist and there will be enough time in the billion-year
future for humans to evolve less risk-averse attitudes. Of course, clause
(iii) of the Risk Principle? might still demand an aggregate risk attitude
that favours the Quiet End Foundation over the Happy Future Fund. Af-
ter all, it does say explicitly that, when aggregating the different possible
aggregate risk attitudes of the different populations that might be affected,
the risk-averse aggregates should receive greater weight than the evidence
suggests. And so even if adding many risk-inclined individuals to the pop-
ulation in scenario A gives a risk-inclined aggregate for that outcome, it
must still be aggregated with the risk-averse aggregates from the other
outcomes, and in a way that gives more weight to those risk-averse aggre-
gates. What’s more, the transition away from the evolutionary pressures
mentioned above will take some time, and then the evolution of the more
risk-inclined attitudes will take further time, and so even if scenario A does
include a lot of risk-neutral or risk-inclined individuals in the reasonably
far future, it will also continue to include a lot of risk-averse individuals be-
tween now and then. And, one further point: it’s not clear which evolution-
ary pressures would bring about this transition to greater risk-inclination;
would the lack of the original evolutionary pressures be sufficient?
Nonetheless, let’s suppose for a moment that it is plausible that sce-
nario A contains sufficiently many risk-inclined individuals that the Risk
Principle? does lead us to aggregated risk attitudes that demand the Happy
Future Fund instead of the Quiet End Foundation. Even then, there is
another consideration that favours the Quiet End Foundation: the risk-
neutral or risk-inclined people whose attitudes skew the aggregate more
risk-inclined are the lucky ones; they are the ones inhabiting the good out-
come of the decision; they suffer no harm. It is precisely those who will
suffer harm who have the risk-averse preferences that would lead them
to choose the option that reduces the chance of the scenario they inhabit
coming about. It seems that, in such a situation, the risk-averse unlucky
individuals should be given even more weight.
5.4 The correct theory of rational choice
The final premise of our argument that we might reject is its endorsement
of risk-weighted expected utility theory. We might argue that it is simply
not rational to choose in line with its recommendations for risk-averse or
risk-inclined individuals. Rationality, we might argue, simply requires you
to be risk-neutral and choose in line with standard expected utility theory,
just as the longtermists have always assumed. Indeed, you might take the
present argument to be a reductio of Buchak’s theory, and add it to other
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objections that already exist. Buchak has given thorough responses to the
main objections to her theory (Buchak, 2013, Chapters 5-7). I will present
just one sort of objection and response, which are distinct from but closely
related to ones that Buchak considers.
Recall Sheila. She’s planning a birding trip and has to choose on Mon-
day between going to nature reserve N1 and nature reserve N2 on Wednes-




But what’s more, she’s got to choose on Tuesday between going to nature





That is, at N3, as at N1, Sheila will see 49 new species for sure. But at
N4, she’ll see 100 species if the winter migration has started and none if it
hasn’t, the precise reverse of N2. What’s more, all the new species she’ll see
at N3 or N4 are distinct from the species she’ll see at N1 or N2. Risk averse
as she is, and thinking it just as likely the migration has started as that
it hasn’t, she will choose N1 on Monday and N3 on Tuesday, thus seeing
98 new species over the course of the two days. But notice: if she’d in-
stead chosen N2 and then N4, as she was perfectly capable of doing, she’d
end up seeing 100 species for sure over the course of the two days. That
is, Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory demands of Sheila, as
a risk-averse individual, that she choose a dominated pair of options, N1
then N3; and indeed similar examples can be given for any other sort of
risk-sensitive individual, whether risk-averse or risk-inclined, though not
for a risk-neutral individual who chooses in line with expected utility the-
ory. Surely this reveals its inadequacy as a decision theory? Or so this
objection claims.
My response: how we should respond to this case depends on whether
we specify that Sheila knows on Monday that she’ll face both the choice
between N1 and N2 and then the choice between N3 and N4, or whether
we specify that she doesn’t know this.
Suppose she doesn’t know it. Then it’s not clear that there is anything
troubling about the fact that Buchak’s theory leads her to pick a dominated
pair of options. To see this, consider a case in which expected utility the-
ory leads you to pick a dominated pair of options. Suppose your credence
in a proposition changes between one time and another because you gain
new evidence between those times and update your credences in the light
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of that. Then there will be a bet that expected utility theory will tell you
to accept at the earlier time, when you have one credence in the proposi-
tion, and a different bet it will tell you to accept at the later time, when
you have a different credence in that proposition, and yet taken together,
this pair of bets will lose you money for sure—that is, accepting both of
them is dominated by rejecting them both. But that doesn’t show that your
change of credence is irrational nor that the decision theory you use to de-
cide whether or not to bet is faulty.
Next suppose that Sheila does know the sequence of choices she’ll face:
N1 vs N2 on Monday and N3 vs N4 on Tuesday. Then that changes the
decision problem she faces on Monday.11 After all, what Sheila chooses
on Monday might affect what she’ll choose on Tuesday. And if that’s the
case, she should choose on Monday knowing that her choice will have that
effect on her Tuesday decision, and she should take that into account. For
instance, suppose she chooses the safe option N1 on Monday. Then her
payoff table on Tuesday is really this:
M M
N1+N3 49+49=98 49+49=98
N1 + N4 49+100=149 49+0=49
Now, since this simply shifts the utility of each option at each state of the
world up by the same amount, she will choose N3 (or N1+N3) in this situ-
ation. But now suppose she chooses the risky option N2 on Monday. Then
her payoff table on Tuesday is really this:
M M
N2 + N3 0 + 49=49 100+49=149
N2 + N4 0+100=100 100+0=100
And, in this case, she will choose N4 (or N2+N4). Knowing all this, on
Monday, Sheila’s choice is really between N1+N3 and N2+N4, and so her
payoff table is really this:
M M
N1 + N3 98 98
N2 + N4 100 100
And so she’ll choose N2 on Monday, and then N4 on Tuesday. That is, she’ll
pick the dominating pair of options. So the threat of the objection recedes.
11This observation is sometimes known as sophisticated choice in the decision theory litera-




Thinking about the effects of our actions on the long-term future has led
us to an unsettling place. The future might contain vast quantities of great
happiness, but it might also contain vast quantities of great misery. Any
effort to ensure a long happy future will have to strive both to ensure a
long future and to make it happy; and it might succeed at the former with-
out succeeding at the latter. So our efforts to ensure a long happy future
will increase the likelihood of such a future, but they will also increase the
likelihood of a long miserable future, even if they increase the latter by a
smaller amount than the former. And so, if you are risk-averse, or if moral-
ity requires you to choose using risk-averse preferences, then you do better
to work towards the extinction of humanity. In the final few sections of the
paper, I asked whether there might be a problem with the decision theory
we use or with the conception of the impersonal good that we feed into
it. There is some hope that there is some plausible conception of the imper-
sonal good that assigns sufficiently different moral utilities to the outcomes
that, when fed into risk-weighted expected utility theory, require us to do-
nate to the Happy Future Fund instead of the Quiet End Foundation. But
they seem to me a little ad hoc and in any case not in the spirit of effective
altruism, which is usually more eager to follow where the utilitarian calcu-
lus leads than to adjust the axiology to save our intuitions. So, whatever
the flaw in our argument, I don’t think it lies there.
Perhaps, then, the flaw lies in the consequentialist or decision-theoretic
approach to morality that guides the whole approach. However, as Greaves
& MacAskill (2021) point out, most moral theories would permit other con-
siderations to be overridden when the quantity of impersonal good at stake
is of the magnitude considered here. Most people who think that individ-
uals have a right to choose whether or not to try to have a child will think
that this right can be overridden in a particular case if for some reason exer-
cising that right would lead to immense misery for a large group of people.
So, we might imagine, if the considerations adduced in favour of the Quiet
End Foundation are weighty enough, they will override any rights that
would be trampled by pursuing that strategy.
So I conclude not satisfied that I have identified where this argument
goes wrong, but hopeful that it does. But the existence of this argument,
so close in form to the arguments given by the longtermists in favour of
devoting resources to those projects rather than to well-understood, near-
term health interventions such as distributing insecticidal nets, casts doubt
on those arguments.
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7 Appendix: the calculations
7.1 The expected utilities of SQ, QEF, and HFF
First, the expected utility of doing nothing (SQ):
P(A|SQ)U(A) + P(B|SQ)U(B) + P(C|SQ)U(C) + P(D|SQ)U(D) =
pw + qv + ru− st
Second, the expected utility of donating to the Quiet End Foundation (QEF):
P(A|QEF)U(A)+ P(B|QEF)U(B)+ P(C|QEF)U(C)+ P(D|QEF)U(D) =
(p− 2ε)w + (q− 2ε)v + (r + 6ε)u + (s− 2ε)(−t) =
pw + qv + ru− st− 2εw− 2εv + 6εu + 2εt
Third, the expected utility of donating to the Happy Future Fund (HFF):
P(A|HFF)U(A)+ P(B|HFF)U(B)+ P(C|HFF)U(C)+ P(D|HFF)U(D) =
(p + 3ε)w + (q + 2ε)v + (r− 6ε)u + (s + ε)(−t) =
pw + qv + ru− st + 3εw + 2εv− 6εu− εt
Now:
(i) QEF ≺ SQ iff −2εw− 2εv + 6εu + 2εt < 0 iff −w− v + 3u + t < 0 iff
3u + t < w + v.
(ii) SQ ≺ HFF iff 0 < 3εw + 2εv− 6εu− εt iff 6u + t < 3w + 2v.
So QEF ≺ SQ ≺ HFF iff 3u + t < w + v and 6u + t < 3w + 2v.
7.2 The risk-weighted expected utilities of SQ, QEF, and HFF
First, the risk-weighted expected utility of doing nothing (SQ):
REU(SQ) = (1− R(P(A ∨ B ∨ C|SQ)))U(SQ & D)+
(R(P(A ∨ B ∨ C|SQ))− R(P(A ∨ B|SQ)))U(SQ & C)+
(R(P(A ∨ B|SQ))− R(P(A|SQ)))U(SQ & B)+
R(P(A|SQ))U(SQ & A) =
(1− R(p + q + r))(−t) + (R(p + q + r)− R(p + q))u+
(R(p + q)− R(p))v + R(p)w
Now suppose R(x) = x3/2. Then, now adding the specific numbers we
introduced above:
REU(SQ) = (1− (1− 10−9)1.5)(−1019)+
((1− 10−9)1.5 − (1− 10−9 − 10−3)1.5)106+
((1− 10−9 − 10−3)1.5 − (10−6)1.5)1013+
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(10−6)1.51019 ≈ 9, 980, 003, 700, 000
Second, the risk-weighted expected utility of donating to the Quiet End
Foundation:
REU(QEF) = (1− R(P(A ∨ B ∨ C|QEF)))U(QEF & D)+
(R(P(A∨ B∨C|QEF))−R(P(A∨ B|QEF)))U(QEF & C)+
(R(P(A ∨ B|QEF))− R(P(A|QEF)))U(QEF & B)+
R(P(A|QEF))U(QEF & A) =
(1− R(p + q + r + 2ε))(−t)+
(R(p + q + r + 2ε)− R(p + q− 4ε))u+
(R(p + q− 4ε)− R(p− 2ε))v + R(p− 2ε)w
Now suppose R(x) = x
3
2 . Then, now adding the specific numbers we in-
troduced above:
REU(QEF) =
(1− (1− 10−9 + (2× 10−10))1.5)(−1019)+
((1− 10−9 +(2× 10−10))1.5− (1− 10−9− 10−3− (4× 10−10))1.5)106+
((1− 10−9− 10−3− (4× 10−10))1.5− (10−6− (2× 10−10))1.5)1013+
(10−6 − (2× 10−10))1.51019 ≈ 9, 983, 007, 000, 000
Third, the risk-weighted expected utility of donating to the Happy Fu-
ture Fund:
REU(HFF) = (1− R(P(A ∨ B ∨ C|HFF)))U(HFF & D)+
(R(P(A∨ B∨C|HFF))−R(P(A∨ B|HFF)))U(HFF & C)+
(R(P(A ∨ B|HFF))− R(P(A|HFF)))U(HFF & B)+
R(P(A|HFF))U(HFF & A) =
(1− R(p + q + r− ε))(−t)+
(R(p + q + r− ε)− R(p + q + 5ε))u+
(R(p + q + 5ε)− R(p + 3ε))v + R(p + 3ε)w
Now suppose R(x) = x
3
2 . Then, now adding the specific numbers we in-
troduced above:
REU(HFF) =
(1− (1− 10−9 − 10−10)1.5)(−1019)+
((1− 10−9 − 10−10)1.5 − (1− 10−9 − 10−3 + (5× 10−10))1.5)106+
((1− 10−9− 10−3 +(5× 10−10))1.5− (10−6 +(3× 10−10))1.5)1013+
(10−6 + (3× 10−10))1.51019 ≈ 9, 978, 508, 200, 000
So:
REU(QEF) > REU(SQ) > REU(HFF)
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